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BANKRUPTCY—EXEMPTIONS: 
WHEN AN INTERESTED PARTY MUST OBJECT, 
AND EXEMPTING PROPERTY WITH THE INTENTION 
OF RETAINING POSSESSION 
Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010) 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Schwab v. Reilly, the United States Supreme Court partially 
frustrated the primary purpose of bankruptcy by making it more difficult for 
the debtor to exempt property itself, rather than a liquidated interest in that 
property.  The Supreme Court held that when a debtor lists the value of the 
property the debtor wishes to exempt as equal to the fair market value of the 
property as listed on the debtor’s schedules, the debtor has not effectively 
exempted the property itself, but rather only an interest in the property up to 
the value the debtor has listed on his or her schedule.  The debtor must list 
the value of the exemptible property as “100% of FMV” or use similar 
language in order to put the trustee on notice the debtor intends to keep the 
property.  Because this method is not standard practice, there will be several 
rather large problems in the interim until this practice becomes more well-
known. 
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I. FACTS 
Nadejda Reilly filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy after the catering busi-
ness she owned failed.1  In support of her petition, Reilly filed a list of her 
assets on a Schedule B and a list of the property she wished to exempt from 
the bankruptcy estate on a Schedule C.2  On Schedule B, Reilly listed assets 
she described as “business equipment,” which she valued at $10,718.3  The 
list of assets included various items of kitchen and cooking equipment, 
 
1. Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2657 (2010). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
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which Reilly used in the operation of her business, and the estimated values 
of each item.4 
Schedule C contained the various exemptions Reilly claimed for her 
property.5  Among the exemptions were two separate claims of exemption 
in the kitchen and cooking equipment in her attached list to Schedule B.6  
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6), Reilly claimed a “tools of the trade” 
exemption permitting her to exempt an “aggregate interest, not to exceed 
$1850 in value, in any implements, professional books, or tools, of [the] 
trade.”7  Reilly claimed the full “tools of the trade” exemption, $1850, in 
the items listed as “business equipment” on her schedules.8  She then 
claimed the rest of the value of her equipment, $8868, as a “wildcard 
exemption” pursuant to § 522(d)(5).9  The wildcard exemption allows the 
debtor to exempt “interest in any property,” up to $10,225 in value.10 
Prior to the meeting of the creditors, William Schwab, the trustee 
appointed to Reilly’s case, inquired with an auctioneer as to the value of the 
kitchen and cooking equipment.11  The auctioneer informed Schwab the 
equipment may have been worth as much as $17,000, much more than 
Reilly’s estimate of the value of the equipment.12  At the meeting of the 
creditors, held on June 22, 2005, Schwab informed Reilly he intended to 
auction the equipment to retrieve any excess value in it beyond her 
exemptions.13  Reilly responded she would rather dismiss her bankruptcy 
case than lose her cooking equipment.14  Reilly subsequently moved to 
dismiss her bankruptcy petition on June 29, 2005.15  Schwab did not object 
to Reilly’s exemptions, and, before the court ruled on Reilly’s motion to 
dismiss, filed a motion to sell the equipment on August 10, 2005.16  Reilly 
 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) (2006).  Reilly filed her bankruptcy petition in 2005.  
Brief for Respondent at 5, Schwab, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 08-538).  The amount which can be 
exempted under this statute was subsequently adjusted in 2007 and again in 2010 to the current 
level of $2175.  See 11 U.S.C. § 104 (Supp. 2009). 
8. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2657. 
9. Id. 
10. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5).  This value has also been adjusted pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 104.  See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2657 n.1. 
11. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Schwab, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 08-538). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 11.  The equipment held sentimental value for the 
debtor because it had been purchased for her by her parents. Id. at 11-12.  In addition, the debtor 
stated she wished to continue with her catering business post-bankruptcy, which would be 
impossible without the equipment. Id. at 12. 
15. Id. at 11. 
16. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 16. 
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then claimed because she equated the value of the exemption on Schedule C 
to the value of the equipment listed on Schedule B, she put the trustee on 
notice that she intended to exempt the equipment itself, not just the value 
listed on Schedule C.17  She argued because no party in interest objected to 
her exemption within thirty days, as required by Rule 4003(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the equipment became fully 
exempt regardless of its value.18  Schwab argued he was not required to 
object because the amounts listed were clearly within statutory limits and 
the exemption of her interest at those values was proper.19  The bankruptcy 
court denied Schwab’s motion to sell the equipment and also denied 
Reilly’s motion to dismiss the bankruptcy case.20  Schwab appealed to the 
district court, which rejected his claims, and the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed.21 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Bankruptcy has a long and complex history and touches nearly every 
corner of society.22  The Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, contained in Article 1, section 8, gives Congress the power to create 
“uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States.”23  James Madison wrote in 1788, regarding the Bankruptcy Clause, 
that “bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of 
commerce . . . that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into 
question.”24  First, this section briefly discusses the history of bankruptcy 
and its modern evolution.25  Then, it considers the subject of modern bank-
ruptcy discharge and its purposes.26  Finally, this section addresses exemp-
tions and objecting to exemptions.27 
 
17. Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2010). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 2659. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 325, 325 (1991). 
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
24. The FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
25. See infra Part II.A. 
26. See infra Part II.B.1. 
27. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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A. THE HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY:  FROM BRUTAL ENDS TO 
FRESH STARTS 
The concept and focus of bankruptcy has changed dramatically since 
its most primitive forms.28  Reviewing bankruptcy’s history is key to under-
standing how modern bankruptcy protections work and how those protec-
tions shield debtors.29  This section first describes early forms of bank-
ruptcy and attitudes toward debtors.30  Next, this section discusses early 
English bankruptcy law as the foundation for American bankruptcy law, 
including the concept of discharge.31  Finally, this section examines the 
evolution of both American law since the Constitution and the concept of 
discharge.32 
1. Ancient Bankruptcy 
Historically, bankruptcy was a “ghastly evil,” an unthinkable slight in 
early commerce.33  Bankruptcy laws were severe and entirely unconcerned 
with the welfare of the debtor.34  In early Rome, the “Twelve Tables of 
Roman Law” allowed creditors to enslave a debtor if the debtor defaulted, 
or, if the debtor had many creditors, to divide the debtor’s body into pieces 
and distribute to the creditors in proportion to the amount owed each of 
them.35  Medieval Europe permitted a debtor to avoid imprisonment for 
bankruptcy if the debtor allowed all of the debtor’s possessions to be taken 
by the creditors “amidst shame.”36  “Shame” meant very public sanctions 
upon the debtor, which took various humiliating and almost absurd forms.37  
For example, in Italy, a debtor was made to walk nude into the public 
square and strike his backside against “The Rock of Shame” three times 
while crying “I declare bankruptcy.”38  French bankrupts, upon defaulting, 
were made to wear the “bonnet vert,” a green cap announcing, to the 
 
28. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 5 (1995). 
29. See generally id. (suggesting Congress should seriously consider the long history of 
bankruptcy law before taking radical action to reform the bankruptcy system). 
30. See infra Part II.A.1. 
31. See infra Part II.A.2. 
32. See infra Part II.A.3. 
33. James Q. Whitman, The Moral Menace of Roman Law and the Making of Commerce:  
Some Dutch Evidence, 105 YALE L.J. 1841, 1871 (1996). 
34. See Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor—and a Modest Proposal 
to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 810 (1983). 
35. Id. at 809-10; see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *472. 
36. Whitman, supra note 33, at 1873. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. Many times, the debtor was also banished after this humiliating ceremony. Id. at 
1874. 
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debtor’s humiliation, that the debtor had declared bankruptcy.39  As a 
leading bankruptcy scholar stated, “History’s annals are replete with tales of 
draconian treatment of debtors.”40 
2. Early English Law:  Laying the Foundations of Discharge 
Similar to medieval and ancient laws of bankruptcy, early English 
bankruptcy law was singularly concerned with the rights of the creditor.41  
“Protecting creditors protected commerce, and commerce was king.”42  
Early English bankruptcy laws, the first of which was enacted in 1542, were 
created exclusively for the benefit of creditors.43  The first bankruptcy laws 
were enacted to keep creditors from fighting over assets, not to provide 
rights to the debtor.44  The “[r]elief was not for debtors, but from debtors.”45 
Creditors forced bankruptcy upon debtors in an entirely involuntary 
proceeding.46  Debtors were considered “offenders,” and the laws enacted 
in 1542 and 1570 still threatened the imprisonment of debtors.47  The 
foundation of modern liquidation proceedings could be seen in this process, 
though.48  The debtor’s assets were sold and distributed pro rata to the 
creditors in a similar fashion to a liquidation case today.49  Even after this 
distribution, there was no discharge of the debt.50  “[C]reditors were free 
after bankruptcy to continue to pursue individual collection remedies 
against the debtor.”51  The laws of 1542 and 1570 would continue to be the 
standard for nearly 150 years, with changes only strengthening the ability of 
creditors to collect.52 
The origins of the discharge of debt in bankruptcy came in 1705, when 
England passed a statute allowing debtors a discharge if they were coop-
erative in the distribution of their assets.53  This statute was passed not out 
of good will to the debtor, but in an effort to increase the amounts collected 
and the ease of collection from the debtor in bankruptcy by encouraging 
 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Tabb, supra note 22, at 327. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 329. 
44. Id. 
45. Tabb, supra note 28, at 8. 
46. Id. 
47. Tabb, supra note 22, at 329. 
48. Tabb, supra note 28, at 8. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Tabb, supra note 22, at 331-32. 
53. Id. at 333. 
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debtors to refrain from concealing assets and engaging in other fraud in 
order to hinder their creditors.54  Under the Statute of 4 Anne, honest but 
unfortunate debtors who cooperated in the administration of their estate 
could receive a discharge of their debts if the commissioners, a position 
similar to that of the modern trustee, certified the debtor had conformed to 
the requirements of the bankruptcy proceeding.55  The power of the com-
missioner to grant a discharge was mitigated the very next year by passage 
of an act requiring creditors’ consent to grant the debtor discharge.56  The 
requirement of creditors’ consent seriously hampered the debtor’s ability to 
obtain a discharge.57 
The 1705 acts also created the precursors to the modern concept of the 
exemption.58  The debtor was allowed to keep necessary clothing for his 
family.59  In addition, the debtor was granted an allowance out of the estate, 
which could not exceed 200 pounds and was contingent on the creditors 
receiving a certain percentage of the estate after administrative costs.60 
3. Bankruptcy in America:  The Debtor Sees Relief 
It is quite likely the Framers of the U.S. Constitution had the British 
bankruptcy system in mind when formulating the Bankruptcy Clause.61  
James Madison believed bankruptcy was such an important force in com-
merce that it should be addressed on a national level.62  Congress sparsely 
used the Bankruptcy Clause and never successfully created a national bank-
ruptcy system in the first hundred years of the nation’s existence,63 despite 
being granted the incredibly broad power to pass uniform laws concerning 
bankruptcy.64 
Finally, in 1898, a permanent Bankruptcy Act was passed.65  This Act 
provided the basis for modern American thought about bankruptcy.66  Most 
significantly, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 formed a marked change in 
 
54. Id. 
55. Tabb, supra note 28, at 11. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Vern Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM. L.J. 226, 227 
(1976). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Tabb, supra note 22, at 326. 
62. Tabb, supra note 28, at 13. 
63. Id. 
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
65. Id. at 23. 
66. Tabb, supra note 22, at 364. 
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attitude toward discharge of debt.67  The Act specifically and unequivocally 
rejected the notion that discharge is conditioned on the assent of creditors.68  
Discharge was automatically granted unless the debtor acted dishonestly in 
his or her bankruptcy.69  Creditors were not required to collect a certain 
amount before the debtor could obtain a discharge.70  As the committee 
report for the bill noted, “The granting or withholding of [discharge] is de-
pendent upon the honesty of the man, not upon the value of his estate.”71  
Unless the debtor committed certain dishonest infractions prohibited in the 
Act, the debtor would obtain a discharge.72 
Exemption laws, which were originally used in the eighteenth century 
as an incentive for debtors to cooperate in the bankruptcy,73 had also come 
full circle through a slow evolution of humanitarian laws enacted in the in-
dividual states.74  The most important evolution, though, was the substance 
of the exemption laws.75  First, there were exemptions for clothes.76  Next 
came exemptions for tools of the trade and homesteads, and, finally, ex-
emptions for household items.77  These exemptions held a dual purpose that 
still rings true today:  helping the debtor emerge as a productive member of 
society and protecting the debtor and his family from abject poverty.78 
It is vitally important to see the distinction between the purpose of 
bankruptcy law historically and the purpose of bankruptcy in the United 
States today.  As Professor Seligson wrote: 
[T]he attitude towards and the treatment of delinquent debtors 
have been subjected to significant changes since the days of torture 
and slavery under the Roman law and the days of pillory and 
imprisonment under English law.  The enlightened approach of 
today is to give the unfortunate but honest debtor an opportunity to 
 
67. Id. at 363. 
68. Id. at 364. 
69. Id.  According to the committee report, a debtor acts dishonestly “by committing certain 
acts forbidden in the bill.” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 55-65, at 43 (1897)). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 55-65, at 43 (1897)). 
72. Id. at 366. 
73. Id. at 341. 
74. William J. Woodward, Jr., Exemption, Opting Out, and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 335, 337-38 (1982). 
75. Id. at 338. 
76. Countryman, supra note 58, at 228. 
77. Woodward, supra note 74, at 337-38. 
78. Id. at 337. 
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free himself from the burden of debt.  The Bankruptcy Act treats 
the delinquent debtor with compassionate regard.79 
American law’s sharp move from a pro-creditor to a pro-debtor stance 
signals the attitude that the United States has toward the bankrupt.80  
Excessive debt is no longer a crime, but an unfortunate turn of events.81  
The bankrupt is not in need of punishment, but in need of revival.82 
B. A FRESH START:  CURRENT BANKRUPTCY LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
The two most important concepts to a debtor’s fresh start in American 
bankruptcy law are the concepts of discharge and exemption.  This section 
considers these issues in turn.  First, this section discusses discharge and 
objections to discharge.  Next, this section focuses on exemptions and 
objections to exemptions. 
1. Discharge:  A Fresh Start 
Discharge is the most basic and overarching concept of American 
bankruptcy and is what provides the debtor with a new financial life, more 
commonly known as a “fresh start.”83  In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, § 727(a) 
instructs that the court “shall” grant discharge to the debtor,84 and § 524(a) 
describes how discharge is achieved.85 
First, § 524(a)(1) voids any judgment that was obtained against the 
debtor in the determination of his debts prior to filing bankruptcy.86  There-
fore, if a creditor obtained a judgment against the debtor in a state court, the 
minute the debtor’s discharge is granted, that judgment would have no 
effect against the debtor personally.87  The creditor would have no right to 
levy upon any of the debtor’s property or to pursue the debtor any further in 
collection of the judgment.88 
 
79. Charles Seligson, Major Problems for Consideration by the Commission on the 
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 73, 78 (1971). 
80. Tabb, supra note 22, at 370. 
81. Id. at 364-65. 
82. Id. 
83. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01[1], at 1-4 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 16th ed. 2010). 
84. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2006). 
85. Id. § 524(a). 
86. Id. § 524(a)(1).  Note the statute voids any personal liability of the debtor for judgments 
against the debtor.  Judgments against the property of the debtor are not affected by the discharge. 
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 524.02[1], at 524-20 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
16th ed. 2010). 
87. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86. 
88. Id. 
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Second, § 524(a)(2) to (3) enjoins creditors from pursuing or continu-
ing to pursue prosecution of any debt owed to them by the debtor.89  This 
means the creditor cannot begin any action, whether it be a lawsuit or any 
other action, to collect the debt from the debtor.90  Because the creditors 
cannot enforce a judgment against the debtor and cannot prosecute or con-
tinue to prosecute any debts after the discharge, the bankruptcy proceeding 
is the creditor’s only remedy.91  Any violation of these sections is con-
sidered contempt of court.92 
Before 1978, although the bankruptcy court determined whether the 
debtor had the right to discharge, the effects of that discharge were left up 
to the forum state.93  Debtors during this period faced multiple state 
lawsuits from creditors after receiving a discharge from the bankruptcy 
court.94  At that time, discharge was not an automatic injunction to state 
court actions, but rather an affirmative defense to the action.95  The debtor, 
who had just lost all but the bare essentials, paid a filing fee, paid his or her 
attorney’s fee, and had no money left to defend the lawsuits.96  Thus, the 
creditors would receive default judgments against the debtor and would 
levy on the property the debtor had claimed as exempt.97  The modern 
system enjoining the prosecution or enforcement of these lawsuits serves to 
protect the debtor from ongoing prosecution of discharged debts.98 
The only condition upon the debtor’s discharge is that the debtor does 
not violate any of the exceptions detailed in § 727.99  Most of these 
exceptions involve fraud, usually an attempt by the debtor to conceal assets 
or debt so the creditors receive fewer assets.100  To deny the debtor dis-
charge based on a § 727 exception, a party in interest, either the trustee or a 
creditor, may object to the discharge and state the grounds for denial of the 
discharge.101  This burden reflects the ultimate principle behind modern 
 
89. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2)-(3). 
90. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, ¶ 524.02[2][a], at 524-21. 
91. Id. at 524-22. 
92. Id. 
93. Hearing on S.J. Res. 100 Before the Subcomm. on Bankr. of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 90th Cong. 22 (1968) [hereinafter Hearing on S.J. Res. 100]. 
94. Id. 
95. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 83, ¶ 20.01[2][d], at 20-10. 
96. Hearing on S.J. Res. 100, supra note 93, at 22. 
97. Id. 
98. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, ¶ 524.02[2][a], at 524-21. 
99. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2006). 
100. See id. § 727(a)(1)-(12) (describing exceptions that do not grant discharge to a debtor 
due to fraud). 
101. Id. § 727(c)(1)-(2). 
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discharge:  that an honest debtor will receive his discharge unless a party in 
interest proves the debtor has acted dishonestly.102 
2. Exemptions:  Something upon Which to Build 
At the outset of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, all of the debtor’s assets 
become property of the estate.103  Some of the property in the estate may 
then be reclaimed by the debtor as exempt.104  Essentially, the debtor may 
set aside some property and keep it from the claims of creditors.105 
The purpose of exemptions is undoubtedly clear:  “to provide [the 
debtor] with the basic necessities of life so that even if his creditors levy on 
all of his nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left destitute and a 
public charge.”106  In other words, the debtor is allowed to retain enough 
possessions to begin life anew.107  Since 1978, federal bankruptcy law has 
allowed the individual states to choose between allowing the debtor to use 
the federal exemptions or to opt-out and only allow the debtor to use the 
exemptions provided for in state law.108  The exemptions the debtor can 
take and how much property he or she can exempt vary significantly from 
state to state.109  Because the way a debtor exempts property in bankruptcy 
is unaffected by the substance of the exemptions, whether supplied by state 
or federal law, Schwab v. Reilly has a universal effect on the process of 
exemption.110 
Under § 522(1), a debtor must file a list of property the debtor claims 
as exempt.111  Rule 4003(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 
requires the debtor file this list as part of his or her schedule of assets 
required by Rule 1007(b)(1)(A).112  Official Form 6 contains a Schedule C, 
on which the debtor is required to list the property he or she is claiming as 
exempt.113  Schedule C instructs the debtor to:  describe the property, 
specify the law “authorizing” the exemption, and give the value of the 
exemption along with the current market value of the property without 
 
102. Tabb, supra note 22, at 365-66. 
103. Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2657 (2010). 
104. Id. 
105. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, ¶ 522.01, at 522-14. 
106. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 126 (1978). 
107. Id. 
108. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (2010). 
109. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, ¶ 522.02[2], at 522-17. 
110. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(a). 
111. Id. 
112. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b). 
113. FED. R. BANKR. P. form 6. 
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deduction for the exemption.114  In other words, the debtor must show the 
propriety of the exemption by stating which law authorizes it and how the 
exemption fits within the strictures of that law both categorically and 
monetarily.115 
There are several different types of exemptions available to the debtor 
under § 522, including the general exemption, also known as the “wild 
card” exemption, and the “implements of trade” exemption.116  In 2004, the 
general exemption, as codified in § 522(d)(5), allowed for the exemption of 
the debtor’s interest up to $975 of any of his or her property.117  In addition, 
the general exemption allowed the debtor to add to its limit any unused 
portion of the homestead exemption up to $9250.118  Thus, the maximum 
value of the “wild card” exemption was $10,225.119  The wild card exemp-
tion “may be applied to any property that is property of the estate . . . .”120  
The primary purpose of this exemption is to allow the debtor greater 
flexibility in the use of other exemptions, as well as preventing discrimina-
tion against nonhomeowners by allowing them to use a large portion of the 
homestead exemption for personal property.121 
The “implements of trade” exemption allows the debtor to exempt his 
or her interest in “implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of 
the debtor . . . .”122  The maximum interest exemptible was limited to $1850 
in 2004.123  The reason for this exemption is quite clear:  “to help preserve 
the debtor’s means of earning a living.”124 
According to § 522(l), after the debtor has listed exemptions on Sched-
ule C, the property is exempt unless a party in interest timely objects.125  
Timeliness of the objection is determined by Rule 4003(b), which states 
objections made to a claim of exemption must be made within thirty days 
after the meeting of the creditors.126  This limitation is strictly enforced.127  
In Taylor v. Freeland and Kronz,128 the debtor listed a cause of action on a 
 
114. Id. 
115. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, ¶ 522.05[1], at 522-30. 
116. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(1)-(12) (West Supp. 2010). 
117. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) (2006).  This amount has been adjusted.  See supra note 9. 
118. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) (Supp. IV 2004). 
119. Id. 
120. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, ¶ 522.09[5], at 522-68. 
121. Id. at 522-67. 
122. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6). 
123. Id. (Supp. IV 2004). 
124. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, ¶ 522.09[6], at 522-68. 
125. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (2006). 
126. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b). 
127. Id. 
128. 503 U.S. 638 (1992). 
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Schedule B list of assets and noted the value of the claim was “un-
known.”129  She then listed the proceeds from the cause of action as 
exempt.130  The trustee took no action to object to the claim of exemption, 
and when the debtor received a significant recovery—much higher than the 
trustee had anticipated—the trustee sought to recover those funds for the 
estate.131  In Taylor, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, despite the fact the 
lawsuit was not a proper exemption, the trustee’s failure to object in a 
timely fashion, pursuant to section 522(l) and Rule 4003(b), barred him 
from challenging the validity of the exemption.132  The debtor and the 
trustee agreed the debtor was only entitled to a small amount of the pro-
ceeds from the lawsuit, but because the debtor exempted on her schedules 
all of the proceeds and the trustee failed to object, all of the proceeds 
became exempt.133 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Schwab v. Reilly, Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion to 
which Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Alito and Sotomayor joined.134  
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, whereby Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Breyer joined.135  In reversing the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the majority held Schwab did not have an obligation to object to a 
claimed exemption because the exemption was proper on its face and, 
therefore, his motion to sell Reilly’s equipment to recover excess value 
should have been granted.136  The dissent argued that because Reilly indi-
cated she intended to exempt the property itself, rather than just an interest 
in the property, Schwab had an obligation to object and, therefore, his 
motion to sell should have been denied.137 
A. THE MAJORITY 
First, the Court addressed whether an interested party has an obligation 
to object under § 522(l) when the code specifies that the debtor is exempt-
ing an interest up to a certain amount and the debtor’s valuation of the 
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exemption is clearly within those limits.138  Next, the Court addressed the 
applicability of Taylor and whether it dictated the trustee had an obligation 
to object to the exemption.139  Finally, the Court discussed foreseeable 
ramifications with adopting Reilly’s view and explained how a debtor may 
exempt property itself, rather than an interest in that property.140 
1. Whether the Interested Party Must Object 
The majority began its analysis by rejecting the debtor’s contention that 
the controlling language in § 522(l) was the provision stating “property 
claimed as exempt on [such list] is exempt” unless a party objects.141  The 
Court instead pointed to the language of the same subsection, stating the 
target of the objection must be the “list of property that the debtor claims as 
exempt under subsection (b).”142  The Court noted the categories of exemp-
tions Reilly invoked defined the property the debtor may exempt as an 
“interest” up to a certain dollar amount, not the assets themselves.143  The 
Court held Reilly’s definition of “property” was grounded in language from 
Schedule C and dictionary definitions, which were superseded by the Code 
when they differed.144  Because Reilly only exempted $10,718 of her 
interest in her property, not the property itself, Schwab was entitled to sell 
the property to recover any excess value.145 
While Reilly argued she put Schwab on notice that she intended to 
exempt the property itself by equating the exemption value to the market 
value,146 the Court decided whether the debtor intended to exempt the 
property itself was not a consideration the trustee must take into account.147  
The Court concluded Schwab was entitled to evaluate the propriety of the 
exemption based on three considerations:  first, the description of the equip-
ment, to ensure it qualified as property the exemption contemplated; 
second, the specific Code provisions “governing” each exemption; third, the 
listed value of the claimed exemption.148  The market valuation of the 
property is there purely for the purpose of helping the trustee determine 
whether there may be excess value in property beyond what the exemptions 
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allow.149  Thus, because the value exempted and the type of property 
exempted was within the statutory guidelines in the exemption invoked, 
there was nothing warranting an objection.150  The fact that the value of the 
exemption was equated to the market value of the property on Schedule C 
had no effect.151 
2. Taylor v. Freeland and Kronz 
The Court held the court of appeals erred in determining Taylor was 
applicable to Schwab.152  The Court explained, “Taylor does not rest on 
what the debtor ‘meant’ to exempt.”  Instead, Taylor applies to the face of 
the claim of the exemption.153  In Taylor, the debtor listed the value of a 
lawsuit as “unknown” when she claimed it as an exemption.154  Because an 
unknown value is not plainly within the limits of the exemption, the trustee 
had an obligation to object.155  In other words, the Taylor test specifies that 
if the value claimed as exempt is not plainly within statutory limits, the 
party in interest has an obligation to object.156 
The Court explicitly rejected the court of appeals’ reading of Taylor, 
which focused on the “unstated premise” that “a debtor who exempts the 
entire reported value of an asset is claiming the ‘full amount,’ whatever it 
turns out to be.”157  The Court gave two reasons for rejecting this premise.158  
First, it explained this would require the Court to expand the definition of 
“property claimed as exempt” beyond an interest in the property.159  
Second, the Court explained the “universe of information” a party in 
interest must look to when determining the propriety of an exemption 
would expand because the party would have to look to inferences on the 
debtor’s bankruptcy forms rather than the facial validity of the exemptions 
themselves.160  Thus, the Court took Reilly’s claim of exemption at face 
value, that she exempted a $10,718 interest in her property rather than a 
certain item of property, and ruled Taylor inapplicable.161 
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3. The Ramifications 
Reilly argued her reading of § 522(1) was fundamental to the “goal of 
giving debtors a fresh start” and preventing interested parties from “sleep-
ing on their rights.”162  The Court disagreed, concluding Reilly’s approach 
“threatens to convert a fresh start into a free pass.”163  The Court reasoned 
that Congress weighed the negative effect exemption limits have on debtors 
with the negative effect exemptions have on creditors.164  The Court then 
refused to alter this balance by adopting Reilly’s approach.165 
The Court proposed how a debtor may exempt the asset itself if the 
debtor so desires.166  The Court suggested doing so “in a manner that makes 
the scope of the exemption clear.”167  For example, the Court recommended 
the debtor, instead of giving a value for the exemption, write “full fair 
market value (FMV)” or “100% of FMV.”168  This demarcation, the Court 
said, would require the trustee to object to recover any value above the 
statutory limit for the estate.169  If the trustee failed to object, the full value 
of the asset would be exempted.170 
B. THE DISSENT 
The dissent, written by Justice Ginsburg, argued Reilly made it clear 
she intended to exempt the property itself, not an interest up to $10,718 in 
the property.171  The dissent further argued that because no party in interest 
objected, the property should have been excluded from the estate as 
exempt.172  The dissent rejected the Court’s holding that the trustee did not 
have to object to the debtor’s valuation of her exemption.173  The dissent 
stressed the importance of the current-market valuation of the exempt 
property and argued the majority stripped the current-market valuation of 
its usefulness.174  Justice Ginsburg contended the better holding would have 
been that a debtor who lists a market value below the monetary cap for the 
exemption and lists an identical amount as the claimed exemption has 
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signaled he or she intends to keep the property itself.175  An item with a 
market valuation above the cap signals to the trustee the debtor recognizes 
he or she cannot shield the property from sale but intends to claim an 
exemption out of the proceeds.176  If the trustee fails to file a timely 
objection, the right to keep the property should be secured to the debtor.177  
Essentially, the dissent held that market valuation is key to determining the 
propriety of the exemption, and thus Rule 4003(b) should be read to require 
the party in interest to object to a market valuation the party believes is not 
proper.178 
The dissent then asserted that requiring objections to market valuation 
or exempted property facilitates the primary purpose of the exemptions:  
giving the debtor a fresh start.179  Most notably, the objection deadline 
produces finality in the exemption procedure.180  The debtor may plan for 
the future with the “knowledge that the possessions she has exempted in 
their entirety are hers to keep.”181  Under the majority’s holding, the dissent 
noted, a trustee may at any time during the bankruptcy case, until discharge, 
gain another opinion on the value of the property, then auction off the 
property and simply hand the debtor a check for the amount listed on the 
schedule.182  This, the dissent opined, severely hampers the debtor’s ability 
to plan for the future, and thus harms the fresh start.183 
The dissent then addressed three concerns the majority had with 
reading Rule 4003(b) to require objection to market valuation.184  First, the 
Court expressed concern that requiring this objection would greatly increase 
administrative costs by increasing the number of objections the trustee must 
make.185  The dissent disagreed, stating the trustee already had the responsi-
bility of determining market valuation in order to determine whether there 
was excess value in the property, and applying Rule 4003(b) simply puts a 
deadline on that process.186  The dissent pointed out if the trustee needed 
more than thirty days to assess the market value, the trustee had many op-
tions available to extend the deadline.187  A trustee may obtain an extension 
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from the bankruptcy court for cause or may postpone the conclusion of the 
meeting of the creditors.188  Thus, trustees have “ample mechanisms at their 
disposal to gain the time and information they need to lodge objections to 
valuation.”189 
Secondly, the dissent disputed the majority’s contention the trustee 
would lack fair notice of the need to object.190  The dissent stated if a debtor 
listed identical values for the exemption and the market value, the debtor 
would have on the face of the schedule “reclaimed the entire asset just as 
surely as if she had recorded ‘100% of [market value].’”191  Justice 
Ginsburg also stated a debtor completing a Schedule C would think it 
nonsensical to enter “FMV” when the schedule tells the debtor to enter the 
dollar value.192  There would be no way for pro se debtors to know they 
must ignore the instructions and input the correct warning flags.193 
Finally, the dissent disputed the majority’s contention that requiring 
objections would give debtors the incentive to undervalue their assets in 
hopes the trustee would fail to object.194  As the dissent noted, there are 
many procedural safeguards to protect against falsifying or lying about 
information on the schedules, including an oath which makes the debtor 
liable for perjury and the possibility of denial of discharge under § 727.195  
In addition, the objection procedure itself is designed to be a safeguard 
against undervaluation, and thus the dissent deemed the majority’s fears 
irrational.196  Therefore, the dissent would have upheld the Third Circuit’s 
ruling that the property was exempt.197 
IV. IMPACT 
The Court based its holding that the trustee does not need to object to 
an exemption pursuant to Rule 4003(b) when the value of the exemption 
and the market value of the property are listed as equal values, based on the 
conclusion that when a value is listed for an exemption, it can only 
represent a monetary interest, not a possessory interest.198  This is contrary 
to the spirit of the bankruptcy code, the history of our bankruptcy laws, and 
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the plain purpose of the exemptions themselves. Modern American 
bankruptcy law has overtly stated a social, rather than a financial, pur-
pose.199  Bankruptcy’s primary goal is revitalization of the debtor through 
discharge, rather than repayment of the creditors.200  Each exemption has a 
particular purpose.  For instance, the tools of the trade exemption seeks to 
allow the debtor to keep property which is useful for the debtor’s particular 
line of work.201  Allowing the debtor to keep this property aids the debtor in 
continuing in his or her line of work, therefore becoming a productive 
member of society who can pay his or her debts again.202  By the Court’s 
formulation, the trustee always has the right to auction the property because 
the debtor is only entitled to the amount of money the property represents, 
not the property itself.203  But the money is less useful to the debtor than the 
tools themselves.204  Therefore, the majority’s conclusion that an “interest” 
only refers to a monetary interest, not a possessory interest, is counter-
intuitive to the purpose of the exemptions. 
The holding of Schwab v. Reilly has a potentially far-reaching impact 
because the standard practice when completing Schedule C is to list iden-
tical values of the exemption and the market value if the debtor intends to 
exempt the property itself.205  Certainly, a debtor thinks more about keeping 
his or her property rather than keeping the money the property is worth.  As 
evidence of this, a popular “how to” book on filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
tells its readers to focus on the property they “really want to keep.”206  
Because debtors almost always have property they “really want to keep,” 
the holding of Schwab v. Reilly will affect almost every Chapter 7 filing. 
First, when the debtor wants to exempt the property itself, he or she 
must list either “100% of fair market value” or “full fair market value” in 
the “value of the exemption” column of Schedule C.207  The consequences 
if the debtor fails to do so could be disastrous, particularly if the debtor is 
exempting assets that may change in value.  A good example of this is if the 
debtor decides to use the wildcard exemption and fill up the homestead 
exemption, using § 522(d)(5), by exempting $10,000 in stock the debtor 
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owns.  The debtor lists $10,000 as the market value of the stock on 
Schedule C and also lists $10,000 as the value of the exemption.  Six 
months later, before the debtor receives his or her discharge, the company 
in which the debtor owned the stock releases a revolutionary new product 
that has the effect of doubling the value of the stock to $20,000.  Because 
the debtor only exempted a $10,000 interest in the stock, the trustee, 
without objecting, can force the sale of the stock and recover the excess for 
the estate.  If the debtor had listed “100% of fair market value,” however, 
he or she would have been able to keep the stock itself, unless the trustee 
objected before the end of the thirty-day period. 
Until the requirement to write “100% of FMV” or similar language is 
well-known, its short-term effects could hit debtors very hard, particularly 
in the homestead exemption.208  Because houses are another category of 
property that changes value, debtors may encounter the same situation as 
the stock example, except this time their house is being sold.  In addition, 
the value of the property is, many times, worth less to the debtor than the 
property itself.209  If the property is sold, even if the debtor gets the full 
current market value, the debtor will not be able to get a comparable 
possession at the same price, nor will those possessions be as useful.210  In 
Reilly’s case, if the Trustee sold all of Reilly’s equipment, it would be 
practically impossible for Reilly to carry on in her trade as a caterer.  This 
would entirely frustrate the purpose of the tools of the trade exemption.  
Therefore, debtors will be impeded in regaining their places as productive 
members of society.  This is of special concern, considering the large num-
ber of bankruptcy cases that are filed pro se.211 
Two things must be done immediately to ensure debtors are aware of 
this change.  Schedule C must be immediately changed to instruct the 
debtor how to exempt the property if the debtor would like to retain pos-
session, as the debtor will likely want to do.  This is of the utmost impor-
tance because, as the dissent noted, the holding of Schwab v. Reilly will 
seem nonsensical to a debtor who is completing the schedule.212  Secondly, 
attorneys must be careful to advise their clients on how to exempt the whole 
interest in the property to mitigate any possibility that a debtor’s fresh start 
will be hampered. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Bankruptcy law has evolved from the early days of violence and 
imprisonment.213  Its intent is now more humanitarian and utilitarian, 
purposing to give debtors a fresh start and make them productive members 
of society again.214  As part of this goal, bankruptcy law has allowed for the 
discharge of debt and for exemptions of property from the estate to ensure 
debtors can get back on their feet.215 
In Schwab v. Reilly, the Supreme Court partially frustrated this purpose 
by making it more difficult for the debtor to exempt the property itself, 
rather than just a liquidated interest in that property.216  The Supreme 
Court’s holding that the debtor must write “full fair market value” or a 
similar phrase in the column for the value of the exemption on Schedule C 
is neither intuitive from the schedule nor the modus operandi.217  Thus, if 
debtors intend to exempt the property itself, they must follow the correct 
procedure, or it will be possible for debtors to lose their property.218 
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